On India’s ‘RAW’ Chief’s Whirlwind Visit
Maj. Gen. HRM Rokon Uddin (Retd.)
The recent visit of Parag Jain, chief of India’s intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), to Bangladesh has raised questions in the country’s political and security circles. According to published reports, Jain visited Bangladesh with a four-member delegation and held meetings with senior security officials. He reportedly visited China before coming to Bangladesh. The visit should be viewed in the context of South Asia’s changing geopolitical situation rather than simply as a courtesy call. At the same time, the visit itself is not evidence of any conspiracy. Border security, terrorism, separatism, cross-border crime and intelligence sharing can all be legitimate subjects for discussions between intelligence chiefs.
However, high-level intelligence contacts are also driven by national strategic interests. The important question is what India may seek from Jain’s visit and how Bangladesh should respond. Jain’s reported visit to China before coming to Bangladesh is particularly significant. India and China have recently sought to reduce tensions and stabilize their relations despite their long-standing border dispute. The disputed border, covering about 3,500 kilometres, including Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, remains a major issue between the two countries. There is no reliable evidence that India is preparing to make major territorial concessions to China. New Delhi continues to describe Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India. Therefore, claims that India is “surrendering” to China are more speculation than fact.
The broader strategic shift, however, is important. US-China competition, changes in the global balance of power, and India’s economic and security interests may encourage New Delhi to maintain controlled competition with Beijing while seeking greater stability along the border. For Bangladesh, the key lesson is that the country should not become a pawn in competition among India, China and the United States. India is also likely to be interested in understanding Bangladesh’s new political reality. Sheikh Hasina’s stay in India, the issue of her extradition, changing public opinion in Bangladesh and the rebuilding of relations with Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government are all important for New Delhi.
It is therefore possible that one purpose of Jain’s visit was to understand Bangladesh’s new political structure, security environment and the future direction of India-Bangladesh relations. However, firm claims about any hidden agenda require evidence. A major political allegation in Bangladesh is that India became too closely associated with the Sheikh Hasina government over the past 15 years instead of maintaining relations with the Bangladeshi state and its people. This has contributed to distrust of India among a significant section of the population. In the new political reality, India would also benefit from building relations with Bangladesh’s institutions, state and people rather than with particular individuals or political parties.
Bangladesh, meanwhile, must remain cautious. Foreign intelligence agencies may seek to influence political parties, bureaucrats, businesses or security institutions. Such activities are not unusual in international politics. But accusing individuals of being “RAW agents” without evidence is dangerous. It can weaken efforts to identify genuine security threats. Counter-intelligence checks, financial investigations, security clearance reviews and legal investigations should be used to identify actual threats. The primary responsibility of RAW, CIA, ISI or any other intelligence agency is to protect the interests of its own state. Therefore, Bangladesh’s security cannot depend on the goodwill of foreign powers. It depends on the country’s own intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities.
The assassination of Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada and Canada’s allegations of possible involvement by Indian government agents show why foreign intelligence activities and national security concerns cannot be taken lightly. However, there is no public and verifiable evidence to suggest that a similar plan exists against Prime Minister Tarique Rahman or his family. There should nevertheless be no complacency regarding the security of the prime minister. Foreign visits, international conferences, bilateral meetings and other official engagements require independent threat assessments, counter-surveillance and layered security measures. Security decisions should be based on intelligence and professional risk assessments, not speculation.
Bangladesh’s more immediate vulnerability may be energy security rather than politics. Bangladesh has a contracted capacity to import about 2,656 megawatts of electricity from India. Around 40 megawatts of electricity from Nepal also reaches Bangladesh through the Indian grid. Adani Power’s Godda plant in Jharkhand has an installed capacity of about 1,600 megawatts, most of which was developed for Bangladesh. In 2025, Adani supplied about 8.63 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity to Bangladesh, accounting for around 8.2 percent of the country’s total electricity supply. At times, the share has been significantly higher. Such dependence creates a strategic vulnerability.
The Rampal power plant has a generating capacity of about 1,320 megawatts. However, describing it as completely “Indian-controlled” would be inaccurate. It is operated by Bangladesh-India Friendship Power Company Limited, a 50:50 joint venture between Bangladesh Power Development Board and India’s NTPC. Ownership, however, is not the only measure of strategic dependence. Technology, energy sources, financing, management, spare parts and maintenance are also important. Prolonged power shortages can affect industries, hospitals, water supplies, communications and law and order, eventually creating political instability.
Bangladesh should therefore seek to reduce excessive dependence on India, but this should not mean adopting anti-India policies. The two countries will remain neighbours, and geography cannot be changed. However, the degree of dependence can be reduced. Domestic gas exploration, diversified LNG supplies, renewable energy, energy storage, hydropower from Nepal and Bhutan, nuclear energy and regional grid connectivity should all be considered as part of a long-term strategy.
The same principle applies to politics. If a government depends on the goodwill of India, China, the United States or any other foreign power to remain in office, that represents a national security weakness. The source of a government’s legitimacy should be the people, the Constitution and strong institutions. The same evidence-based approach should apply to officials and military officers who served during the previous government. If there is evidence of corruption, political repression, foreign influence or illegal activities, those allegations should be investigated.
The question of Sheikh Hasina’s return or extradition should also be handled according to law and national interests rather than emotion. The state should have a clear plan for dealing with legal, security and political consequences if she returns. Bangladesh’s foreign policy should therefore follow the principle of “Friendship with all, dependence on none.” There should be friendship with India, but not dependence. There should be cooperation with China, but not surrender to Chinese influence. There should be partnership with the United States and the West, but Bangladesh should not become anyone’s geopolitical proxy.
